longer at a disadvantage," objective indicators reveal that North American women continue to experience inequities in social, occupational, and educational settings (Baker & Fortin, 2000; Everston, 2004; Roth, 2003; Statistics Canada, 2000) . Despite evidence of their continued disadvantaged status, women frequently deny that they are personally discriminated against, even while recognizing that women as a group experience discrimination, a phenomenon known as the personal/group discrimination discrepancy (Crosby, 1982 (Crosby, , 1984 Dion & Kawakami, 1996; Foster & Matheson, 1998 , 1999 Quinn, Roese, Pennington, & Olson, 1999; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990; Taylor, Wright, & Ruggiero, 1991) . Substantial research has examined cognitive (Crosby, Cordova, & Jaskar, 1993; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Rutte, Diekmann, & Polzer, 1994; Zanna, Crosby, & Lowenstein, 1987) and motivational (Crosby et al., 1993; Foster, 2000; Hodson & Esses, 2002; Taylor et al., 1990) bases for the phenomenon. Furthermore, it seems that emotional factors may contribute to the cognitive and motivational processes related to the personal/group discrimination discrepancy (Mackie & Smith, 2003) . It was the goal of the present investigation to evaluate the extent to which women's perceptions of discrimination may be a function of the qualitative nature of their emotional reactions and to assess the impacts of such reactions on women's attributions and the actions they endorse to contend with discrimination.
The Role of Emotion in Responses to Discrimination
Experiencing discrimination may be associated with feelings of anxiety, depression, hopelessness, and overall reduced psychological well-being (Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Frable, 1993; Landrine, Klonoff, Gibbs, Manning, & Lund, 1995; Mays & Cochran, 2002; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Postmes, 2003; Williams, Shore, & Grahe, 1998) . Although the distress associated with discrimination might motivate group members to deny such experiences (Foster, 2000; Kobrynowicz & Branscombe, 1997) , it is conversely possible that the negative affect induced is a necessary precursor to motivating actions to respond. For example, women who perceived discrimination but did not report negative affect in relation to this experience were least likely to engage in collective action to address it (Foster & Matheson, 1998) . In this instance, women might have viewed the discrimination as legitimate, unchangeable, or personally irrelevant (i.e., social mobility across barriers was still a possibility), a pattern of perceptions typically associated with acceptance of the disadvantaged status of one's group (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993) .
Interestingly however, those women who perceived little personal discrimination but nonetheless experienced affective discontent were most likely to take collective action to address discrimination (Foster & Matheson, 1998) . It has similarly been noted that individuals who perceived their group as strong or effective and experienced anger regarding their treatment by an outgroup were more likely to take confrontational action (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004) . Taken together, these findings suggest that although the distress associated with discrimination experiences may sometimes motivate denial of its occurrence, the negative affect elicited by such experiences might also be integral to taking collective action.
To some degree, cognitive and behavioral responses to discrimination may depend on the qualitative nature of the negative affect experienced. It has been suggested that anger is the emotion most evident when discrimination is encountered and recognized as unjust (Crocker & Major, 1994; Kappen & Branscombe, 2001; Mackie et al., 2000; Matheson & Cole, 2004; Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Moghaddam, Taylor, Ditto, Jacobs, & Bianchi, 2002; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003) . As anger represents an energizing emotion that elicits an active response to a situation (Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Larson & Diener, 1992; Lemerise & Dodge, 1993) , it is not surprising that when individuals experienced anger in response to their group's treatment, it served as a catalyst for action, and particularly confrontational actions on behalf of the group (Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2004; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003) .
More commonly, responses to discrimination, or rather the lack of response, have been understood in terms of patterns of attributions that are typically associated with depressive affect or sadness. Specifically, to the extent that discrimination is associated with perceptions that the event is caused by internal characteristics (e.g., personal deservingness) or is viewed as pervasive (stable and global), feelings of helplessness, self-blame, and poor psychological well-being, including sadness, may be elicited (Branscombe et al., 1999; Foster, 2001; Foster, Matheson, & Poole, 1994; Schmitt et al., 2003) . In this regard, sadness may serve two functions (Stearns, 1993) . One involves turning attention inward and has been associated with a perceived lack of control, passivity, withdrawal, and reduced attention to external cues (Cunningham, 1988; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda et al., 1989) . However, when sadness is expressed, it may also serve to signal others that one is experiencing distress and that help is needed (Stearns, 1993) . In either case, sadness is unlikely to facilitate perceptions of being able to contend effectively with discrimination, and hence, denial may be the most adaptive response.
Social Expectations Guiding the Expression of Emotions
Although anger or sadness might have a direct impact on women's responses to discrimination, these reactions likely depend on whether there are situational factors that constrain women's ability to act on their emotions (Matheson & Cole, 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2004) . Indeed, although the dominant emotional response to discrimination might be anger, actions to overcome the disadvantaged status of one's group are not common (Foster & Matheson, 1999; Klandermans, 1997; Louis & Taylor, 1999; . The strategies perceived as available to contend with discrimination may be limited by normative expectations for what constitutes socially appropriate behavior, and in particular, expectations pertaining to the management or regulation of negative emotions such as anger or sadness. For example, the expression of anger may be regarded as less socially appropriate than the expression of sadness (Lemerise & Dodge, 1993) , but the appropriateness of expressing either of these emotions may vary across situations and cultures (Andersen & Guerrero, 1998; Trierweiler, Eid, & Lischetzke, 2002) . There also exist norms dictating who can appropriately express anger and who can express sadness. In particular, there are greater pressures to regulate or contain negative emotions among members of minority groups, especially in the presence of dominant group members who control resources (Gross & John, 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) . Similarly, there are gender-based social pressures and expectations in that women are more likely than men to be encouraged to express sadness and to be discouraged from expressing anger (Brody, 2000; Brody & Hall, 1993; Hess et al., 2000; Kelly & Hutson-Comeaux, 1999) . In short, social and contextual norms that convey the appropriateness of expressing or suppressing the expression of one's emotions might have implications for individuals' ability to contend with an event.
The cognitive and behavioral effects associated with the capacity to express one's emotions may be linked to the nature of the emotions themselves (Trierweiler et al., 2002) . Although sadness in itself is not an emotion that activates behavior (Larson & Diener, 1992) , encouragement to express such feelings may elicit the interper-sonal function of sadness that entails signaling that help is needed. In light of the possibility of acquiring social support (through the expression of sadness), the ability to diminish the negative factors that elicited the distress may be viewed as more feasible. Yet, such actions are unlikely to stray from normative behavioral prescriptions that are likely to be supported by others (Stearns, 1993) . In contrast, social pressures to suppress the expression of sadness are consistent with the passive qualities of this emotion that might encourage withdrawal or acceptance behaviors. In effect, there is no reason to suppose that social expectations regarding emotional expression of sadness would alter women's perceptions of discrimination. However, those women who are permitted to express sadness may be unique in their behavioral efforts to alter their situation, albeit by adopting strategies that are likely to meet with social approval.
When angered, women who are encouraged to express their emotions may be less concerned with gaining social approval but instead might directly confront those who are responsible for the discrimination and correct the injustice through collective action (Mackie et al., 2000; Van Zomeren et al., 2004) . Recall however that although the dominant emotional response to discrimination might be anger, actions to overcome discrimination are not common (Foster & Matheson, 1999; Klandermans, 1997; Louis & Taylor, 1999; Wright et al., 1990) . Indeed, minority group members, including women, are normatively discouraged from expressing negative affect (Brody, 2000; Keltner et al., 2003) . Such expectations to suppress the expression of anger might undermine women's sense of control or efficacy and hence attenuate the likelihood that they would endorse actions to directly contend with the situation, although such inaction may be associated with some degree of resentment (Folger, 1987; Louis & Taylor, 1999) . Moreover, expectations that women suppress the expression of their anger may have an oppressive effect due to the incongruence between the act of suppression and the activating properties of anger. This incongruence may result in considerable distress (Butler et al., 2003; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997) . To reduce this distress under socially constrained conditions, women may be motivated to minimize perceptions of discrimination, thereby alleviating the need to resolve the discrimination.
The Present Study
The goal of the present study was to examine the potential role of women's emotional responses to discrimination (sadness vs. anger) and the effects of a social context that permitted or discouraged the expression of these emotions on women's cognitive and behavioral responses. As indicated earlier, emotional reactions may be an integral aspect of responses to discrimination, and denying personal discrimination may reflect a motivated response to reduce distress. To assess the causal role of emotions, women were primed to experience either sadness or anger in advance of being exposed to a situation of gender-based personal discrimination. This was done by using a story re-creation task employing affectively loaded words that reflected either sadness or anger (vs. a control condition in which affect was not primed). Subsequently, women were personally targeted in a situation of gender discrimination, after which they were provided with an explicit instruction that it was appropriate to express or suppress their emotional reactions (vs. a control condition with no such instructions). The following were hypothesized:
1. Overall, women primed to feel sad would report diminished perceptions of discrimination and would be more likely to attribute the cause of the event to internal and pervasive factors than women primed to feel angry. On the whole, women who were not emotionally primed were not expected to differ predictably from either women who were saddened or angered. 2. The effects of the emotion primed on women's perceptions of discrimination and attributions would vary depending on expectations regarding emotional regulation. These expectations were not expected to influence the perceptions and attributions of women primed to feel sad. However, among women who were angered, those who were encouraged to express their emotions were expected to perceive greater discrimination and to be less likely to attribute the cause of the event to internal or stable factors (the latter reflecting greater perceived efficacy to alter the situation) relative to angered women told to suppress their emotions or whose emotional regulation response was not explicitly proscribed. Finally, women who were not emotionally primed may not be as emotionally focused, and hence situational norms regarding the expression or suppression of their feelings were not expected to affect their perceptions. 3. On the whole, women would be more likely to accept their discriminatory treatment than to endorse actions to contend with it. 4. Variations in the extent to which women endorsed specific actions would depend on the emotion they were primed to feel and the expectations conveyed regarding the regulation of these emotions. Among women primed to feel sad, those encouraged to express their emotions would be more likely to endorse normative responses relative to those expected to suppress their feelings or when no regulation expectations were conveyed. When women were angered, encouragement to express their emotions would facilitate the endorsement of confrontational and collective responses relative to the other expectations conditions, whereas instructions to suppress their emotions may result in angered women being more likely to endorse acceptance of their treatment or an individually based normative response (that would not entail defining the event as constituting discrimination) than angered women who were not expected to suppress their emotions. Fi-
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nally, women in the emotion priming control condition ought to demonstrate the typical pattern of accepting their treatment rather than endorsing strategies to contend with it, irrespective of the expectations conveyed concerning the regulation of their emotions.
METHOD

Participants
For this study, 1st-year female psychology students (N = 108; M age = 24.86 years, SD = 6.48) volunteered to participate in a study on creative abilities and story writing. Of those women reporting ethnic/racial group status, the majority were Euro-Caucasian (n = 55, 51.4%), whereas the remainder were of Asian or Middle Eastern descent (n = 32, 29.9%), African descent (n = 17, 15.9%), or were Native Canadian (n = 3, 2.8%).
Procedure
Women were run individually to ensure independence of responses (particularly in the expressive conditions). Following an overview of the procedures and providing informed consent and background demographic information, women completed the story-writing task. The purpose of this task was twofold: (a) to prime a particular emotion and (b) to provide the basis for a situation of discrimination. A female experimenter told participants that we were interested in identifying factors that contribute to creativity as this ability was important to success in many organizational contexts. To this end, we were asking them to complete a story-writing task to evaluate their creative ability; if their stories passed a predetermined score they would be assigned to the high creativity group (high status), whereas if their stories did not meet this criterion they would be categorized in the low creativity group (low status). The experimenter further explained that the subsequent task of the high creativity group would be to improve the stories created by the less creative participants, whereas those in the low creativity group would perform a second writing task as well as a number of tedious excercises (alphabetizing, sentence completion) to assess the relation between lack of creativity and poor language and writing skills. Allegedly, those who qualified for the high-status group would be eligible to participate in a $100 lottery, whereas those in the low-status group would participate in a $10 lottery. In reality, all participants participated in the $100 lottery. These manipulations were consistent with past research, and the intent was to provide sufficient incentive to make the two groups differentially desirable to belong to (Foster & Matheson, 1995; Lalonde & Silverman, 1994; Wright et al., 1990) . In addition, creating the expectation that a subsequent task would follow the testing session provided a basis for anticipating an opportunity in which women's emotions could be expressed or would need to be suppressed.
The creativity task consisted of reading a story describing an achievement failure situation in which a student received a poor grade in an important course and visits the professor, who has agreed to take a second look at the paper (from Robins, 1988) . The professor discusses the problems with the paper and concludes that he will not change the grade. After reading it, participants recreated and extended the story in their own words with themselves as the protagonist. As they reframed the story, they were instructed to incorporate a list of 12 target words, 5 of which constituted the mood manipulation. Women were randomly assigned to one of three word-list conditions priming (a) sadness: sad, hopeless, discouraged, helpless, despair; (b) anger: angry, hostile, infuriated, irritated, resentful; or (c) a control condition in which the target words were replaced by 5 adjectives with no specific affective content: grade point average, essay, course, future, office. The remaining 7 words were constant across condition (e.g., career, grade, student).
After the experimenter collected the stories, she informed women that the papers would be scored by a panel of judges, allegedly comprising male engineering students learning about psychology and methods of evaluation. When the experimenter left to deliver the stories, women completed a second writing task in which they wrote about something that had occurred in their life or to someone they knew that made them feel very sad, angry, or creative (control), respectively. This task served to maintain or enhance the mood manipulation (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004) while stories were allegedly being scored. Following this second writing task, women completed a mood manipulation check.
Women were then exposed to the discrimination event. When the experimenter returned, she reported that these men never passed the women into the high creativity group. She then informed participants that they too had been assigned to the low creativity group and reminded them of what this involved. The instructions constituting the manipulation of social expectations regarding the appropriateness of emotional expression or suppression were then provided. These instructions were developed to reflect the respective conceptualizations of emotional expression and suppression and also incorporated instructions used in facial feedback studies that might facilitate efforts to express or suppress emotional responses (e.g., Gross & Levenson, 1997) . To enhance their effectiveness, these instructions were framed within the context created by the cover story of the present study. Participants in the expression condition were encouraged to 152 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN feel free to express any thoughts, feelings, questions, or concerns you have . . . to openly express your views and share them in any of the questions we ask you, and in your responses to the task that we'll be asking you to do. This is important as it assures that your responses reflect a sense of commitment and professional concern regardless of what group you are placed in.
In the suppression of emotional expression condition, women were told to inhibit their reactions for the remainder of the study. Specifically they were told, If you have any feelings during the remainder of the study, do not let those feelings show. Try to act in such a way that a person watching you would not know you were feeling anything. This is important as it assures that you maintain your composure and act in a professional manner regardless of what group you are placed in.
No such instructions were provided to women in the expectations control condition. Women then completed a final questionnaire assessing their perceptions of discrimination, attributions for their group assignment, and actions they would endorse to respond to the situation. Finally, women were informed that the study would not proceed to a second task and were given an oral debriefing. To alleviate negative mood, a positive mood induction procedure was conducted prior to thanking and dismissing participants.
Measures
Mood manipulation check. After writing the two stories that served to prime emotion (but prior to the discrimination event), women rated 19 mood adjectives (from Diener & Emmons, 1984) on 7-point scales ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (7). Embedded within these adjectives were items that assessed sadness (hopeless, sad, unhappy, depressed, helpless, and desolate, Cronbach's a = .90) and anger (angry, hostile, and infuriated, Cronbach's a = .89).
Perceived discrimination. The extent to which women perceived personal and group discrimination was based on two items from Taylor et al. (1991) , namely, "To what extent were you personally discriminated against because you are a woman in the context of this experiment" and "To what extent do you feel that women as a group were discriminated against in the context of this experiment?" These items were embedded among six filler items. Women rated the items along an 8-point rating scale ranging from not at all (0) to very much (7).
Attributions for group assignment. To elicit women's attributions for their low-status group assignment, they were asked to consider the most important reasons for why they were assigned to their group. On 7-point rating scales, women then responded to three questions that used the same wording as the Attributional Styles Questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982) . Women were asked whether the cause of their group assignment reflected "something about you or something about other people or circumstances" (internal = 7 vs. external = 1), whether when future "decisions are made about you, do you think that this cause will be present again" (stable = 7 vs. unstable = 1), and whether this cause was "something that affects just this type of situation, or does it also influence other areas of your life" (global = 7 vs. specific = 1). Attributions to internal causes were related to perceiving the cause to be relatively stable (r = .27, p < .01) and global (r = .27, p < .01). These two latter dimensions were also moderately related (r = .42, p < .001).
Action endorsements. Women indicated the extent to which they would be willing to participate in each of five actions if they had the opportunity to respond to their treatment . These actions included accepting the situation, requests for individual or collective retests (normative actions), or confronting the male judges to demand an explanation, either as an individual or collectively (confrontational actions). Endorsements were indicated on a scale ranging from not at all likely to participate (0) to extremely likely to participate (7).
RESULTS
Mood manipulation check.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the emotion priming manipulation, a 2 (self-reported mood: sad, angry; within-subjects)´3 (emotion primed: sad, angry, control; between-subjects) mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, revealing a significant interaction, F(2, 105) = 7.61, p < .001, h 2 = .127. As expected, follow-up simple effects analyses indicated that women primed to feel angry reported greater anger (M = 4.28, SD = 1.85) than did women primed to feel sad (M = 3.25, SD = 1.61), t(70) = 2.54, p < .01, or women in the priming control condition (M = 2.81, SD = 1.81), t(70) = 3.42, p < .001. In contrast, women who were primed to feel sad tended to report higher levels of sadness (M = 4.28, SD = 1.59) than did women who were primed to feel angry (M = 3.78, SD = 1.51), t(70) = 1.37, p = .089, or women who were not emotionally primed (M = 3.71, SD = 1.76), t(70) = 1.43, p = .079. Given that these latter effects were marginal, it is worth noting that women in the sad priming condition reported significantly higher levels of sadness than anger, t(35) = 3.48, p < .001. Thus, the mood priming manipulation was effective, although the strength of this effect may have been greater for anger.
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Effects of Emotion Primed and Expectations Guiding Expression
Perceived discrimination. To evaluate whether emotions and expectations regarding the regulation of these emotions affected perceptions of discrimination, a 2 (level of perceived discrimination: personal, group; withinsubjects)´3 (emotion primed; between-subjects)´3 (expectations: suppression, expression, control; between-subjects) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on ratings of discrimination. The main effect for level of perceived discrimination was significant, F(1, 99) = 10.18, p < .01, h 2 = .093, in that women perceived higher levels of discrimination against women as a group (M = 2.77, SD = 2.43) than against themselves personally (M = 2.34, SD = 2.40). Neither of the main effects of emotion primed or expectations was significant, but the interaction between these factors was, F(4, 99) = 2.65, p < .05, h 2 = .097. Follow-up simple comparisons were conducted to assess whether expectations regarding the regulation of emotions altered perceptions of discrimination among women in each of the emotion priming groups. Women primed to feel sad reported lower levels of perceived discrimination when they were told to suppress their feelings in comparison to the expectation control group, although neither group differed from saddened women who were encouraged to express their feelings (see Table 1 ). Furthermore, among women primed to feel angry, as expected, those who were encouraged to express their feelings reported higher levels of discrimination in comparison to the expectation control condition, but neither group differed significantly from women told to suppress their feelings. Finally, emotional regulation expectations did not affect women's perceptions when mood was not primed. Although the emotion primed and expectations interacted to influence women's perceptions of discrimination, they did not moderate the difference in perceived levels of personal versus group discrimination, Fs < 1. In fact, perceptions of personal and group discrimination were highly correlated, r = .84, p < .001.
Attributions. When women's attributions (internal, stable, global) for their assignment to the low-status group were assessed using a 3 (emotion primed)´3 (expectations) between-groups multivariate ANOVA, the two-way interaction was found to be significant, Pillais = .227, F(12, 297) = 2.02, p < .05, whereas neither of the main effects was. The univariate analyses subsumed by this multivariate effect indicated that the interaction between the emotion primed and expectations was significant for attributions regarding internal, F(4, 99) = 2.76, p < .05, h 2 = .100, and stable causes, F(4, 99) = 2.99, p < .05, h 2 = .108, but not perceptions of whether the cause was global (M = 3.66, SD = 1.82). Follow-up simple effects were conducted to assess the effects of emotional regulation expectations on internal and stable attributions within each of the emotion priming groups. As indicated in Table 1 , when women were primed to feel sad, expectations had no effect on their internal attributions. In line with our hypotheses however, when women were angered and encouraged to express their emotions, they were less likely to attribute the cause of their discriminatory treatment to internal factors, but only in comparison to the expectation control group (which also did not differ from women told to suppress their emotions). The reverse was true if women's mood had not been primed in that these women were more likely to attribute the event to internal factors when they were encouraged to express their emotions than in the expectations control condition. Perceptions of the cause as stable among women primed to feel sad were greater when they were instructed to either express or suppress their emotions in comparison to when no expectations were conveyed. However, among women primed to feel angry, they were least likely to view the event as reflecting stable factors when they were instructed to suppress their emotions. There were no differences in attributions of the stability of the cause as a function of expectations among women who were not emotionally primed.
Action endorsements.
Of particular interest in the present study was the role women's emotions and expecta-154 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Importantly, the three-way interaction between actions endorsed, emotion primed, and expectations was also significant, F(16, 396) = 2.07, p < .01, h 2 = .077. Simple effects analyses conducted for each of the emotion priming groups indicated that the interaction between the expectations conveyed to women regarding the regulation of their emotions and the action being endorsed was significant when women were primed to feel sad, F(8, 132) = 2.30, p < .05, or angry, F(8, 132) = 2.17, p < .05, but not when no emotion was primed, F(8, 132) = 1.07, ns. As seen in Table 2 , women primed to feel sad and encouraged to express their emotions were less likely to accept their status and demonstrated a higher probability of endorsing normative (individual or collective retest) actions in comparison to women who were not provided with explicit expectations (although neither group differed significantly from women instructed to suppress their feelings). In contrast, among women primed to feel angry, instructions to express their emotions resulted in greater endorsement of collective action taking, either retest or confrontation, in comparison to those who were told to suppress their emotions and greater endorsement of normative (retest) collective actions than angered women who were not provided with explicit regulation instructions (see Table 2 ). In addition, conveying emotional regulation expectations (suppression or expression) to women primed to feel angry increased the likelihood that they endorsed an individual retest. Emotional regulation expectations did not influence the action endorsements of women who were not emotionally primed; these women were most likely to accept their status.
The Motivational Effects of Emotions: Exploring a Mediated Model
It was initially argued that women's negative emotional responses to discrimination might motivate recognition or denial of discrimination, which in turn may influence their behavioral response to a discriminatory event. To explore this possibility, the correlations between women's self-reported mood, perceived discrimination (combining personal and group perceptions), and action endorsements were examined (see Table 3 ). Self-reported sadness was not related to perceptions of discrimination, and hence, these perceptions were not a viable mediator of the relations between sadness and the actions women endorsed. However, consistent with Baron and Kenny's (1986) considerations for a mediated model, women's self-reported anger (predictor) was related to perceived discrimination (mediator) as well as their action propensities (outcomes). In addition, perceived discrimination was related to women's action-taking endorsements. Thus, the mediating role of perceptions of discrimination on the relation between feelings of anger and actions was assessed.
As seen in Table 4 , when the relations between anger and women's action endorsements were examined after controlling for perceptions of discrimination (both the mediating and predictor variables were entered in the same step of the regression), anger was no longer a significant predictor of women's acceptance of their treat- ment or their endorsement of individualistic or collective retest actions. Moreover, as indicated by the Sobels values assessing the significance of the mediated paths, the relation between anger and women's willingness to endorse a collective retest to contend with it was fully mediated by perceived discrimination. The relation between anger and women's reluctance to accept their situation also appeared to be mediated by perceptions of discrimination, although the mediated path was only marginally significant in this instance. However, given the significant partial correlations between anger and confrontational actions, the significant Sobels values suggest that perceived discrimination was only a partial mediator of these relations. Thus, women's willingness to endorse confrontational actions, whether individualistic or collective, appeared to involve both a direct effect of anger as well as an indirect effect emanating from the greater perceived discrimination that was associated with such anger.
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DISCUSSION
The primary goal of the present investigation was to assess the effects of the interaction between the emotions experienced and expectations regarding the expression or suppression of these emotions on women's perceptions and responses to a discrimination event. Consistent with past research, women perceived higher levels of discrimination against women as a group relative to themselves as individuals (Crosby, 1982 (Crosby, , 1984 Foster & Matheson, 1995 Moghaddam et al., 2002; Taylor et al., 1990; Taylor et al., 1991) . Moreover, these perceptions were influenced by the emotions women were primed to experience and the expectations that were conveyed regarding the appropriateness of expressing these emotions. Specifically, among women primed to feel sad, those who were told to suppress their feelings reported lower levels of discrimination than did women for whom expectations regarding the regulation of their emotions were not conveyed. Although we had 156 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN not anticipated this difference in perceptions as a function of social expectations, it might be that pressures to suppress sadness were particularly likely to evoke the more inward-looking function of sadness involving selfblame and feelings of helplessness (Stearns, 1993) and hence a reduced likelihood of defining the event as discrimination. Moreover, given that the expression of sadness is stereotypically encouraged for women relative to men (Brody, 2000; Hess et al., 2000) , it may not be surprising that when explicitly discouraged from doing so, women's perceptions were more likely to deviate from those reported in the no explicit expectations condition. As anticipated, among women primed to feel angry, those who were encouraged to express their emotions perceived the highest levels of discrimination, although the perceptions of women encouraged to express versus suppress their emotions did not differ. On the whole, women's self-reported subjective experience of anger was related to perceiving greater discrimination, which is consistent with an accumulating body of research emphasizing the importance of anger in reactions to discrimination (Mackie et al., 2000; Matheson & Cole, 2004; Mikula et al., 1998; Swim et al., 2003; van Zomeren et al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2003) .
Women's emotional reactions had further implications for how they explained the discrimination experience (attributions). However, their attributional patterns were not entirely consistent with our hypotheses. On average, women who were primed to feel sad or angry did not differ in their attributions for the event. It is possible that although depressive affect is typically associated with internal attributions, sadness is not. Indeed, it has been argued that sadness is more strongly linked to a perceived lack of control (internal or external), whereas shame or guilt are more likely to be associated with the self-blame that is characteristic of depressive affect (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004; Stearns, 1993) . Alternatively, given that self-reported feelings of sadness were not directly related to women's perceptions or attributions in the present study, it is possible that the induction of sadness simultaneously primed other emotions, such as anxiety, that might have influenced women's responses. Indeed, although anger and sadness are regarded as distinct prime emotions, they frequently co-occur, and distinguishing between their antecedent factors and behavioral outcomes may be difficult (Stearns, 1993) . Given that anger is the emotion that is most likely to be induced in response to an injustice (DeSteno et al., 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2004) , it is possible that even when induced to feel sad, a concurrent sense of anger may have been elicited by the discrimination event itself and hence may have contributed to responses in the intergroup context. Thus, although the present study was designed to elucidate the effects of specific emotions on responses to discrimination, emotional experiences are dynamic and likely comprise a complex set of affective qualities that arise in response to events as they occur.
Differential effects for sadness versus anger might also have been attenuated due to the manipulation itself. Although the manipulations of sadness and anger appeared to be effective in the present study in that these were the mood states that were predominant in the respective conditions, the levels of reported sadness among women primed to feel sad were only marginally greater than the levels reported by women primed to feel angry or who were not emotionally primed. It may be that the sadness word primes were not as powerful as the anger word primes, although the mean levels of the intensity of sadness and anger reported in the respective priming conditions were identical. As noted earlier, the expression of sad feelings is more normatively appropriate for women, and hence women may have been more likely to self-report some degree of sadness in general.
Although the main effect of the emotion primed on women's attributions was not evidenced as predicted, when women were angered, the expectations conveyed regarding the regulation of this emotion influenced their causal attributions; these expectations did not influence the internal attributions made by women who were primed to feel sad. When women were angered and encouraged to express their emotions, they were less likely to attribute the cause of their discriminatory treatment to internal factors in comparison to the expectations control group. Norms encouraging the expression of anger did not attenuate women's attributions that the event was due to pervasive (stable and global) factors, although contrary to expectations, angered women who were instructed to suppress their emotions were more likely to diminish the stability of the causal factors. In retrospect, this likely represented a cognitive coping strategy for these women; not only did they regard the experience as rare, but these same women were also less likely to view the event as reflecting group-based discrimination. Such a pattern of perceptions would minimize the need to respond to their treatment and the distress associated with the incongruence between the act of suppression and the activating properties of anger (Butler et al., 2003; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997) .
Women whose mood had not been primed were more likely to attribute the discrimination event to internal factors when they were encouraged to express their emotions (in comparison to the no expectations control group). It is possible that among this group of women, the performance aspects of the experimental task (creative ability) may have been particularly salient, thereby Gill, Matheson / EMOTION AND DISCRIMINATION 157 increasing internal attributions for their failure, particularly when instructed to focus on the affect that may have emanated from the failure experience. Although the expectations conveyed to women regarding the regulation of their emotions were not predicted to influence cognitive responses when primed to feel sad, it was anticipated that behavioral responses would vary. Indeed, women who were primed to feel sad and to express their feelings were less likely to endorse acceptance of their situation and more likely to endorse normative (retest) actions to rectify the situation in comparison to women who were not provided with explicit emotion regulation instructions (but not women who were instructed to suppress their emotions). As noted previously, sadness in itself is not an emotion that activates behavior (Larson & Diener, 1992) , but encouragement to express sadness may trigger the functional component that entails signaling others that help is needed (Stearns, 1993) . Consequently, these women may have felt that action to alter their situation was possible, but they were only willing to endorse normative strategies that might receive the approval and support of others.
As previously reported (Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2003) , among women who were primed to feel angry, encouragement to express their emotions heightened the likelihood that they endorsed collective actions to contend with the discrimination. Anger may facilitate women's recognition of discrimination, and the "outrage" associated with this experience may motivate action to redress the injustice (Mackie et al., 2000) . The psychological mechanism linking anger to collective action taking was further explored in the present study by assessing the extent to which this relation was mediated by women's perceptions of discrimination. These mediational analyses supported the possibility that anger facilitated greater perceptions of discrimination, which in turn predicted somewhat lower acceptance and greater endorsement of actions to contend with it. Interestingly, confrontational responses were only partially mediated by such perceptions; anger had an additive impact in motivating these actions. This pattern of findings suggests that anger may play a critical motivating role in the endorsement of collective actions, and in particular those that are confrontational. Anger may be associated with perceiving greater ingroup strength, which may facilitate feelings of group efficacy (Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2004) .
The present findings suggest that the qualitative nature of women's emotional reactions to discrimination has implications for both perceptions of discrimination and the actions endorsed to contend with it. Admittedly, a limitation of the present research was the use of a simulated experimental context. This may have contributed to the relatively low levels of perceived discrimination reported. Although women's propensities to deny such experiences may have attenuated their perceptions of personal discrimination, it was somewhat surprising that the perceived discrimination against women as a group was not greater. This might also reflect our measure of group discrimination; although this measure typically makes reference to the discrimination experienced by women in general, in the present study, they were asked about the extent to which women in this study were discriminated against. Given that women could only make such inferences on the basis of their own experiences, it is likely that perceptions of personal and group discrimination would be highly related (as they were) and not greatly different from one another. Thus, the present study might best be construed as having assessed perceptions of personal discrimination rather than tapping into the more general personal/ group discrimination discrepancy. This said, our reliance on a sample of university students might also have meant that these women were less cognizant of their options and the implications of discrimination. Indeed, Beaton and Tougas (1997) noted that the more women experienced discrimination, the more likely they were to acknowledge that women were discriminated against and to support actions to counter the discrimination. Thus, even outside the laboratory context, it seems likely that women's emotional reactions may play a role in moderating women's responses to discrimination and over time may have a synergistic effect as women gain the resources and experience that facilitate effective responding.
Another limitation of the present investigation concerned the lack of a manipulation check for expectations regarding the regulation of women's emotions. Although women verbally reported that they understood the instructions prior to proceeding with the remainder of the experimental protocol, the specific effects of these expectations were not unambiguous. In particular, although some of the predicted differences in the effects of encouraging the expression versus suppression of emotions were significant, more often, one of these groups differed (in the predicted direction) from the control group that was not provided with explicit expectations, but they did not differ from one another. This raises the possibility that these instructions may have had multiple effects. For example, both sets of instructions may have served to enhance the extent to which women's emotions were salient to them, and so both may have facilitated a more emotion-focused approach. Although these strategies appear to be conceptually bipolar, in fact, the use of emotional expression and containment as coping strategies are often positively conflated (Matheson & Anisman, 2003) . Hence,
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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN rather than representing opposing strategies, they may share commonalities, with different aspects coming into play depending on the nature of the response being assessed. Also of question however might be the extent to which women actually complied with the expectations conveyed and did so successfully; this too may have diminished the differences between groups when women were cued to emotional regulation norms. In some instances, women may deliberately choose not to comply with social expectations, particularly if they perceive the situation to be unjust (Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2004; Wright et al., 1990) , and so their motivation and effort to do so might uniquely influence their responses. Although not the focus of the present study, no doubt there are individual differences that likely influence the extent to which group members choose to comply with social pressures and expectations, such as perceptions of social support (Foster, 2000; Mackie et al., 2000) and feelings of efficacy (van Zomeren et al., 2004) . Even among those who wish to comply, there might exist individual differences in their ability to express or suppress their emotions. Such differences could be assessed using self-report measures (Gross & John, 1997) or situationally, for example by videotaping participants and coding the emotion-specific cues that reflect expressivity (Gross, 1999; Gross & John, 1997) . In effect, individuals who are less able or less motivated to comply with social expectations may respond differently despite the situational constraints. Thus, although the present study suggested that the expectations conveyed regarding the expression versus suppression of emotions influenced women's perceptions and action endorsements in response to a discriminatory experience, there may be a number of individual differences factors that influence how group members choose to respond to those expectations.
